July 12, 2009

South Korean News Reports Kim Jong-Il Has Pancreatic Cancer

Honestly (and all perfunctory “wouldn’t wish it on anybody” statements aside), I don’t know if the presumably imminent departure of Kim Jong-Il (the five-year survival rate of people with pancreatic cancer is a mere 4%) and the rise of his son, Kim Jong Un (whom Kim Jong-Il named as his successor last month — which is no secret to anyone but the North Korean people, who apparently haven’t yet been told) is a good thing, or a bad thing.

What I do remember are the warnings we heard when Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il’s father, was dying, and Kim Jong-Il was poised to assume power — which can be boiled down to: “If you think the father is crazy, wait ’til you get a load of the son.”

What do we know about Kim Jong Un, and what can we expect — or fear?

We know he’s young (25), he’s a big drinker, and he was once detained in Japan for trying to travel to Tokyo Disneyland on a forged passport.

Not the most promising start, is it?

The Times Online has more on Kim Jong Un, while Reuters speculates on a post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea:

SCENARIOS: Post Kim, how might events unfold in North Korea?

…

SMOOTH TRANSITION

The longer Kim lives and remains in reasonable health, the greater the chance of a smooth transition of power to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, 25. If Jong-un has 15 or 20 years to cement his position, he may be able to continue the Kim dynasty. …

Under this scenario, financial market players would watch events in North Korea with interest but not trade dramatically either way. Global powers would seek to ascertain the intentions of the new leadership as it took shape. North Korean policy toward the outside world may not alter much.

MESSY TRANSITION

The early death or incapacitation of Kim would complicate the transition. Under this scenario, the regime may rally around Jong-un with Jang heading a collective leadership until the son is ready to assume power. …

If Kim died suddenly, expect North Asia’s financial markets to drop while world powers try to work out who rules a state that has detonated two nuclear devices and has enough fissile material, experts say, to make at least 5-7 more. …

MILITARY TAKES OVER

The sudden death of Kim Jong-il could prompt a military coup. The country’s recent nuclear test, missile launches and threats of war all indicate the military has a major say in policy.

The New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, in a report in January called “Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea,” said a military coup was possible. …

COLLAPSE OF THE STATE

Economic disintegration or a protracted leadership crisis could lead to North Korea’s collapse, sending millions across the border into the wealthy and more populous South or across the more open northern border with China. For South Korea, this would wreck its economy and create social upheaval. …

South Korean estimates have said it would cost $1 trillion or more to absorb the North.

Financial markets in Seoul would plunge given how expensive and messy such a transition could be.

Of the four scenarios, collapse of the state sounds the best — or at least, the least worst — outcome. I find it interesting that a people’s revolution wasn’t mentioned, but perhaps that’s an assumed possibility that could branch off from “Collapse of the State.”

Revolution, frankly, is what I’d like to see; normally, I am dead set against any illegal action against any legitimate government, but (questions about the legitimacy of the North Korean government aside) we’re not talking about a democracy here, or even a relatively (emphasis on the word “relatively”) sane Communist country like China (when you’ve got North Koreans escaping to China for a chance at freedom, you know you’ve got one eff’d-up country); we’re talking about a Communist one-man dictatorship. And a scary, dangerous, to-hell-with-everybody-else dictator with numerous screws missing. Why, if Kim Jong-Il is satisfied enough with Kim Jong Un to make the kid his successor, should we assume this particular nut is going to fall far from that particular tree?

What I wouldn’t suggest is a coup covertly orchestrated by the good old U.S. of A. — which, of course, is how we usually “take care” of countries we don’t like.

I hope Obama isn’t even entertaining the idea of moving in while NK is in transition, and, potentially, chaos. That may sound like needless worry on my part, but Obama has, sadly, confirmed that he’s no peacenik — and concerns about Obama’s weak response to the idea of closing the School of the Americas (euphemistically renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or WHINSEC) have resurfaced just this past week. Triggering the discussion is Obama’s decision to close Guantanamo Bay by January 22, 2010 (about bloody well time, Mr. President), and conflicting reports about whether Obama has decided not to detain Gitmo inmates indefinitely, or whether he is retaining the “right” to hold detainees at his pleasure, even if they have been acquitted of any crime.

Yes, the SOA has, traditionally, trained professional killers and torturers for operations primarily in Latin America, not Southeast Asia — but, on the other hand, how do we know that SOA activity has been limited to Latin America? Do we know that?

Not that anyone, least of all Barack Obama, has asked me, but I’d feel a lot more secure if Obama would send a clear signal that the United States is getting out of the torture and murder-for-hire business by closing the SOA immediately. That doesn’t mean there aren’t other SOAs we haven’t heard about; I assume there are.

(I am highly amused by the breathlessness of breaking news stories today about Dick Cheney running a “secret black ops unit inside the CIA for eight years.” Not amused by the subject matter, mind you, but by the universally shocked reaction to such a thing. Does no one remember Donald Rumsfeld’s Office of Special Plans? “Bush&Co.,” wrote Bernard Weiner in his classic 2003 PNAC Primer [updated in 2006], “would move the war plans forward and, in the interim, try to cobble together some reasonable-sounding ‘intelligence’ that could justify the invasion [of Iraq]. Hence, Cheney’s red-hot anger that the CIA couldn’t, or wouldn’t, come up with the proof required, so Rumsfeld then established his own in-house Office of Special Plans, staffed with PNAC political types rather than intelligence analysts. The required ‘intelligence’ was pasted together from unreliable raw data and rumors from dubious exiles supplied by Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. That ‘intelligence’ was stove-piped directly to Cheney in the White House, thus avoiding having to vet it through the government’s professional analysts, and the green light was turned on, with Powell delivering the laughable pack of lies to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003. The Council wouldn’t vote for a specific authorization for war and so Bush hastily launched ’shock-and-awe’ bombing and the ground-invasion of that country before the international community could organize itself effectively to resist.”)

“What more information could Obama possibly need to reach a final decision on the matter [of the School of Americas]?” asked Nikolas Kozloff more than a year ago. “Given widespread public disgust towards torture and the like, Obama’s meekness on WHINSEC is perplexing. … Obama also supports closing Guantánamo, which makes his statements on WHINSEC all the more befuddling.”

Perhaps. Or perhaps not.

Posted by: Sapphocrat

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